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ABSTRACT 
This article attempts to answer the question "Is religious freedom incompatible with gender justice in a multi-ethinic society?" by 
examining the processes of legal reform in India. The paper looks, in deatil, at contemporary debates about the role of the state in religion 
from the perspective of ensuring inalienable rights for women. 
RESUME 
Cet article tente de repondre a la question : « la liberte religieuse est-elle incompatible avec la justice pour les femmes dans une socidte 
multi-ethnique? » en etudiant le processus de la reforme judiciaire en Inde. Cet article etudie en detail les debats contemporains sur le 
rdle de 1'etat dans la religion, en partant de la perspective d'assurer des droit incommutables pour les femmes. 
Is religious freedom incompatible with 
gender justice in a multi-ethnic society? In this 
essay I wish to explore this question by examining 
the case of India. India embarked on a rather 
ambitious programme of development fifty years 
ago; essential to this project was the idea of a 
modern state, which sought to embrace the 
principles of equity, social justice, and secularism to 
be guaranteed to its citizens by the constitution. 
Many of these foundational principles are being 
debated today, making for a re-thinking of the 
principle of secularism as it was originally 
enshrined in the Indian constitution. This re-
thinking of secularism comes from two main 
sources: one is the increasing dissatisfaction of 
minorities with the implementation of secularism, 
and the other is the coming to power of the 
Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP). 
One of the objectives of the BJP is to 
initiate a program of constitutional reform to 
abolish all religion-based personal laws and to 
replace them with a Uniform Civ i l Code (UCC). 
Not surprisingly, this has been resisted by all 
religious communities, who consider their right to 
practice religion-based personal laws essential to 
their religious freedom. Leaders of these religious 
communities, as well as part of the Indian 
academia, have opposed the proposal for a U C C 
and reaffirmed their demand for the continuation of 
religion-based personal laws. 
The importance of this debate, as it is 
currently formulated, stems from the way in which 
it pits the need for religious freedom as essentially 
incompatible with the demands for gender justice. 
Those who oppose the formulation of a civil code 
refuse to take cognizance of the disastrous impact 
religion-based personal laws can have on women. 
More importantly, they criticize the ways in which 
the Indian state has historically intervened in 
religious law. On the other hand, those who 
champion the civil code proposal are more often 
than not insensitive to the potential problems of 
opening up family law to the intervention of the 
state.1 This debate is important to women in the 
current Indian context where the agenda of 
formulating a civil code has been almost wholly 
appropriated by political factions who have 
proclaimed their often chauvinistic and anti-
minority values. 
As I will argue, this opposition between 
religious pluralism and legal uniformity derives 
from the communal and patriarchal tendencies 
which have come to dominate political discourse in 
India since the eighties. There are two primary 
theses that constitute this discourse. The first is a 
concern for reviving and defending indigenous 
traditions against all external subventions; the 
second is a tendency towards the unequivocal 
privileging of claims of religious communities over 
claims of communities which are based on 
principles other than religion (for example, those of 
women's groups and trade unions). This has made 
for a situation where women's legal claims, which 
challenge conventional interpretations of religious 
law, have been interpreted as assaults on 
community identity and freedom - so that 
secularism and gender justice have emerged as 
competing - and indeed incompatible - principles. 
The main purpose of this paper is to argue 
that there is a need to dissociate the current 
constitutional debate from this revivalist, anti-
modern and traditionalist discourse. I argue that if 
it is dissociated, neither the demand for reforming 
religious law nor the proposal for a uniform civil 
code appear as essentially antithetical to secularism, 
democracy or freedom. The alleged intervention of 
the Indian state in matters of religion may cease to 
appear as an imposition on the freedom of minority 
communities and can be looked upon as 
interventions that help communities to acquire 
rights that might otherwise be denied to them. In 
most cases, the legal interventions of the Indian 
state have enabled non-religious communities -
particularly women and "backward castes" - to 
acquire rights that a strictly religious interpretive 
schema would not have allowed. The critical task of 
Indian democracy at the present juncture is to 
decide which of these discourses more accurately 
reflects the "general wil l ." 
This does not mean that I wish to imply 
that state interventions in the private sphere should 
be unequivocally endorsed. Mine is a much more 
limited, historically contingent view which 
emanates from the comparison of two different 
modes of intervention in India: one that builds on 
some idea of universalist equity (however 
circumscribed by its modernist premises), and the 
other that draws upon a deliberately chosen 
traditionalist notion of equity. 
In the first section of this paper I discuss 
the nature of secularism posited by the Indian 
constitution. Then I briefly review the history of 
legal reforms of religious law from the colonial 
times to the present, in order to argue that, at least 
up until the 1980s, state interventions sought to 
correct the innately unjust principles of religious 
law. In the third section, I discuss the historic 
judgment of the Indian Supreme Court with regard 
to an indigent Indian woman, Shah Bano, in a case 
that allegedly challenged some fundamental tenets 
of Muslim religious law. The controversy that 
followed the judgment most clearly pitted the 
demands for gender justice against the principles of 
secularism. Next, I will discuss the principal 
features of the constitutional debate that emerged 
out of the Shah Bano controversy. As I mentioned 
above, the debate centers on the proposal to develop 
a uniform civil code that will eliminate the 
influence of religious law. 
Before I proceed, let me say that the 
following discussion is informed by the modernist 
pre-supposition that certain universal norms of 
equity and justice apply across cultures and need to 
be defended whenever they are threatened. Further, 
while laws in and of themselves are certainly not 
adequate for social change, I believe that 
challenging and changing extant legal systems 
remains one of the primary ways in which 
oppressive institutional/ideological structures can be 
confronted. There is also a need to resist the 
aggressive (neo-liberal) plea for the total 
dismantling of the State on the grounds that it 
administers cultural and economic oppression. As I 
hope to show below, the withdrawal of the State, 
more often than not, simply substitutes new forms 
of oppression. In fact, by withdrawing, the State 
affirms oppressive mechanisms that it could quite 
easily control. 
THE NOTION OF SECULARISM IN T H E 
INDIAN CONSTITUTION 
As is well known, India is perhaps one of 
the most multi-ethnic societies of the world, 
comprising a wide array of religious, linguistic and 
sectarian diversities.2 In confronting this staggering 
diversity, the framers of India's Constitution sought 
to shape an overarching Indian identity by adopting 
a "secular" state based on the three principles of 
equality, neutrality and liberty. According to the 
principle of equality, the state was to give no 
preference to one religion over another. The 
principle of neutrality demanded that the state did 
not interfere in religious affairs or organizations of 
religious communities. According to the principle 
of liberty, the state was to permit the practice of any 
religion, within the limits set by certain other basic 
rights, which the state is also required to protect 
(Articles 25-28).3 In addition, the Indian 
constitution guaranteed to all Indian citizens the 
right to use and conserve their "distinct language, 
script or culture" (Article 29); and the right of "all 
minorities, whether based on religion or language," 
to establish and administer educational institutions 
of their choice (Article 30). Most importantly, the 
principle of liberty gave different religious 
communities the permission to practice personal 
laws based on principles of their respective 
religions. 
At least two notions of secularism are 
implied by these constitutional principles. First, 
there is the understanding of secularism in the 
Western liberal sense of the separation between 
religion and the state, and thereby, between the 
public and private realms. The Indian constitution 
thus accepts the liberal premise that legislation 
related to the family belongs in the private realm 
and so should be left outside the reach of the state. 
Second, the principles imply an understanding of 
secularism as the equal treatment of all religions by 
the State - which makes possible the peaceful co-
existence of multiple religions in one polity. 
Mahatma Gandhi favoured this notion of 
secularism, which runs counter to the idea of 
relegating religion to the private realm. Instead it 
embraces the idea that the claims of religious 
communities should be addressed and protected in 
the public realm. In other words, in contrast to the 
liberal principle of separation of state and religion, 
this second notion of secularism provides a 
permanent place for religion in politics. More 
importantly, while the liberal notion of secularism 
pertains primarily to individual rights, the second 
notion concerns itself with community rights. So, in 
its attempts to incorporate both these notions of 
secularism, the Indian constitution also incorporated 
the tension between individual and community 
rights that is inherent in liberalism. 
In fact, the framers of the Indian 
constitution seem to have taken a stand in favor of 
community rights. Thus, while Article 25 
guarantees that "all persons are equally entitled to 
freedom of conscience and the right freely to 
profess, practice and propagate religion," it 
preserves for the Indian state the right to protect 
communities that may be disadvantaged by such a 
propagation of religion. Similarly, at the same time 
that Article 29 guarantees formal equality of all 
Indian citizens, it reserves for the State the right to 
legally serve the needs of both religious and non-
religious minorities (women and children, as well as 
"backward castes").4 
Implicit in this combination of individual 
and community rights are multiple notions of 
equality. In granting the fundamental rights to its 
citizens, the constitution employs the notion of 
formal equality. However, in guaranteeing rights for 
minorities (both religious and non-religious), the 
Indian constitution also adopts the stronger 
principle of substantive equality. By creating 
special legal provisions, the constitution tried to 
arrest and redress systematic discrimination against 
certain groups.s It is in order to endorse these 
principles of substantive equality that the Indian 
constitution legitimized the authority of the state to 
enact laws that might contradict, or at least diverge 
from, the content of religious law, at the same time 
that it guaranteed to its religious minorities the right 
to religious freedom. In other words, there is an 
attempt here to balance the competing claims of 
religious and non-religious communities. 
In fact the making of law in India has 
historically tended to privilege the claims of non-
religious communities over religious communities. 
In particular, it has privileged the claims of gender 
justice over claims of religious freedom. For 
example, beginning from the colonial times, there 
have been several efforts to "reform" religious 
practices and override, through legal reforms, the 
content of religion-based personal laws. This 
project of legal reformism, which has been quite 
central to the nationalist-modernist project 
embraced by the independent Indian state, has been 
severely criticized in recent years. Before 
discussing these criticisms, let us briefly examine 
the nature of the reforms. 
PERSONAL LAWS, RELIGIOUS REFORM 
AND THE INDIAN CONSTITUTION 
It is possible to define two basic elements 
of the legal reforms of religious practice in India. 
The first of these concerned the Hindu system of 
caste. According to this system, an individual is 
born into a "caste," which is a particular social 
group that is "pre-ordained" to perform a specific 
kind of labor. Four such castes are usually 
identified: the Brahmins, the Kshtratiyas, the 
Vaisyas and the Sudras. Brahmins are responsible 
for tasks related to the production of knowledge, 
Kshatriayas for administration and politics, Vaisyas 
for trade and commerce, and Sudras for manual 
labor. Within a strictly Hindu interpretative schema, 
Sudras cannot command the same social status as 
the other three castes and are to be prevented in 
certain specific ways from socializing with the other 
castes. There are, however, groups of people who 
are ranked even lower than the Sudras - their rank 
accruing from the specific tasks they perform. Of 
these, those who help in cremation and related 
activities and in disposing of the carcasses of dead 
animals, are of absolutely the lowest standing and 
traditionally have been treated as "untouchables." 
These castes were socially ostracized, barred from 
all public places and denied access to educational 
institutions. 
The first step in religious reform taken by 
the framers of the Indian constitution was the 
abolition of untouchability. The declaration of 
untouchability as a legally punishable offence was 
accompanied by simultaneous legislation that 
provided for formal equality and non-discrimination 
on the basis of "religion, race, caste, sex or place of 
birth."6 In addition to these efforts to secure formal 
equality, the state also attempted to secure 
substantive equality by reserving for itself the 
authority to take affirmative action for groups 
which have been historically subject to 
untouchability (or more generally, any form of 
disadvantage due to their caste). Given the 
centrality of the caste system in Hinduism, this was 
a remarkably progressive legal step in rationalizing 
religious principles which were unacceptable from 
the standpoint of justice. 
The second element of religious reform in 
India concerns the reform of personal law.7 These 
reforms were initiated as far back in 1829, with the 
abolition of the practice of widow-immolation 
(Suttee). Then, after a gap of almost a century, the 
Child Remarriage Restraint Act was passed in 
1929. In 1947, another act outlawed the institution 
of dedicating young girls to a temple deity.8 In 
1955, a series of enactments deriving from the 
controversial Hindu Code Bi l l radically reformed 
almost every principle of family law based on 
Hindu religious beliefs. These enactments legalized 
inter-caste marriages and divorce and prohibited 
polygamy; they permitted the adoption of daughters 
as well as sons; and they gave the same rights of 
inheritance to daughters as sons.9 
From the point of view of gender justice, 
perhaps the most important of these reforms were 
those relating to women's property rights. As early 
as 1937, the Hindu Women's Right to Property Act 
laid down that where a Hindu died intestate leaving 
separate properties, his widow, or if there is more 
than one widow, all his widows together, were 
entitled to the same share as a son. This was 
followed by an even more radical piece of 
legislation, the Hindu Succession Act of 1956. 
Cutting across various kinds of property rights 
arrangements under various schools of Hindu Law, 
this Act provided for a uniform rule of succession 
making the mother, the widow and the daughter 
equal heirs along with, or without, a male survivor. 
Changes in Muslim personal law also 
began fairly early, with the Shariat Act of 1937. 
This legislation sought to clarify laws involving 
marriage, family and inheritance for all Muslims, to 
the exclusion of other laws throughout British India. 
Again, the most contentious element of this Act was 
the granting of inheritance rights to women. 
Interestingly, the granting of the right of inheritance 
to Muslim women did not constitute a departure 
from the religious principles of Islam in the same 
way that the Hindu Code Bi l l constituted a 
departure from the principles of Hindu orthodoxy; 
rather, as the parliamentary debates of the time 
clarified, the passing of the Shariat Act was simply 
a legal codification of a religious principle that, in 
its original formulation, gave property rights to 
women. As such, the passage of the Shariat Act was 
easier than the enactments related to the Hindu 
Code Bi l l . Also, some committed reformers from 
the Hindu community proposed a similar law for 
community ownership of marital property for Hindu 
women which met with no success (Hassan 1994). 
Thus, the period 1829 to 1955 saw the 
establishment of a legislative framework that 
satisfied some critical principles of gender justice.1 0 
Further, the quite substantial departures from 
established religious principles reflected in these 
laws implied that at least in the "public realm," 
gender justice took precedence over secularism 
(understood as the inability of the state to intervene 
in religion-based personal law). In other words, 
there existed a consensus for challenging the rigid 
public/private divide that requires the state to 
refrain from intervening in familial relationships. 
More fundamentally they also reflected a departure 
from the traditional conceptualization of gender 
relationships as familial relationships only. Finally, 
let us note that this legislative framework was 
established at a fairly early stage in the career of the 
modern Indian state, and was initiated during the 
colonial era. Some critics have argued that this 
"colonial" character of the religious reforms makes 
them essentially external to and inappropriate for 
the Indian people." 
Of course, the enforcement and 
implementation of these laws, however progressive 
they may be in principle, leaves much to be desired. 
The continuing exploitation of women in India 
points not only towards the bureaucratic problems 
of implementation of these laws, but the resilience 
of patriarchy as a societal norm. As the 
constitutional debates of the 1980s indicate, this 
resilience seems to have intensified over time, so 
much so that it resulted in a complete reversal in the 
progressive character of legal reforms of the 1950s. 
As the next section will discuss, the 1980s saw a 
period of desecularization of the political climate, 
within which it has become virtually impossible to 
raise questions of gender equity. 
THE TURNING POINT IN L E G A L 
REFORMISM: 
THE SHAH BANO JUDGMENT 
In 1978, Shah Bano, a sixty-two year old 
Muslim woman from the Indian city of Indore filed 
a case in the local court against her husband. 
Thrown out of her marital home by her husband of 
forty-six years - to whom she had borne five 
children - Bano demanded a living allowance of 
Rs.500 (a meager sum, hardly enough to cover the 
absolute basics for a family of that size). She 
claimed this maintenance under the Indian Criminal 
Penal Code (Section 125) which makes a man's 
refusal to pay for the maintenance of his wives, 
children or parents (in the case that they are unable 
to support themselves) a criminal offense. In the 
case that a man refuses to pay, the court can require 
him to pay up to a maximum of Rs.500 towards 
such maintenance. Soon after Bano went to court, 
her husband chose to divorce her under Muslim 
Personal Law, and thereafter, defended himself 
against her appeal by saying that he had already 
paid maintenance for the period 1976-78, and a 
divorced Muslim woman was not entitled to 
anything more under Muslim Personal Law. 
Implicitly, his counsel was arguing that in issues 
like marriage and divorce, the Indian Penal Code 
could not override Muslim Personal Law. 
Somewhat unexpectedly, the provincial 
court in which Shah Bano filed her appeal ruled in 
her favor. Arguing that, like all other Indian 
women, Bano was entitled to maintenance under the 
Indian Penal Code, the Court awarded her a 
monthly maintenance of Rs.25 (a pitifully small 
sum). Bano appealed this decision to a higher court, 
arguing that the sum was not only inadequate but 
also unjust in view of the fact that her husband 
earned an annual income of Rs.60,000. The court 
ruled again in favor of Bano and increased the 
amount to Rs.179. This time Shah Bano's husband 
appealed the decision to the Supreme Court. In 
April 1985, the Supreme Court again ruled in favor 
of Shah Bano, and ordered her husband to pay her 
maintenance along with legal costs. The decision 
was immediately challenged by conservative 
factions within the Muslim community. The 
General Secretary of the A l l India Muslim League 
proposed a Private Member's B i l l in the Indian 
Parliament that sought to deny a Muslim woman's 
right to seek maintenance under the Indian Penal 
Code. For some factions within the Muslim 
community, the judgment implied much more than 
simply deciding the fate of a divorced woman. They 
saw it as concerning the right of the Muslim 
community to practice their religion freely. In other 
words, the Supreme Court's ruling was taken as a 
revocation of the Indian state's commitment to 
secularism, which, as interpreted by certain 
conservative factions of the Muslim community, 
posed a serious threat to the community. It 
provoked a conservative patriarchal backlash from 
within the Muslim community, leading to a 
situation where Shah Bano herself petitioned the 
Supreme Court to rescind the judgment. 
The government, headed by Prime 
Minister Rajiv Gandhi, was most concerned about 
the loss of the Muslim "vote bank." This concern 
led Gandhi to side with the conservatives, and 
accept the Muslim Women's (Protection of Rights 
on Divorce) Bi l l that the conservatives had 
proposed. The Bi l l , which became one of the most 
controversial pieces of legislation in India's legal 
history, had the following statutes: 
1. The husband's responsibility should 
cease after three months from the date of 
divorce, (or after the delivery of her child 
in case the woman was expecting his child 
at the time of divorce); if, within this 
period, the husband failed or refused to 
pay his dues, then he could be penalized 
under the Indian Criminal Penal Code; 
2. if, after these three months the divorced 
woman was not able to maintain herself, 
she should be maintained by those 
amongst her relatives who would inherit 
her property on her death. 
3. If no such relatives were available, she 
would be maintained by the Muslim 
charitable institutions. Her right to be 
maintained by a charitable institution was 
legally enforceable and could be enforced 
by an Indian court. 
As could be expected, the Act met with a 
public outcry, especially from the progressive 
factions of the Muslim community and from all 
factions of women (Engineer 1987).12 1 will refrain 
here from a discussion of the specific criticisms that 
were voiced. In general, what was most disturbing 
about the process was the complete defiance of 
democratic procedure. In particular, the major 
problem with the Bi l l was that it reversed the two 
principles that characterized the first phase of legal 
reforms in India. First, it gave priority to the claim 
of a religious community over a non-religious 
community, and second, it gave priority to religious 
freedom over gender justice. In doing so it accepted 
the understanding of religious freedom as non-
intervention of the state in the private sphere; 
implicit here is also the substantive claim that 
religion, and issues such as marriage and divorce, 
belonged strictly to that sphere. 
THE SHAH BANO JUDGMENT AND THE 
DESECULARIZATION OF POLITICAL 
DISCOURSE 
The Shah Bano judgment helped to 
mobilize public opinion in favor of a uniform civil 
code (UCC), the greatest support for which came 
from women's groups. However, the cause for the 
U C C was appropriated by the Hindu nationalist 
party (the BJP) and this de-secularized the discourse 
to a large extent. While the BJP did not explicitly 
call for a civil code based on Hindu laws, their 
general agenda of establishing a Hindu nation-state 
implied that all religious minorities would have to 
be assimilated within the political-ideological 
norms associated with Hinduism. 
The basic premise of such the "Hindu" 
model propagated by the BJP is that all social 
entities - the family, the workplace or the State -
should be organized hierarchically, where the 
position of each person in the hierarchy is 
ontologically assigned. The best-known 
manifestation of this principle is the Hindu system 
of castes, which assigns specific tasks to specific 
social groups on the premise that such 
specialization and division of labor creates social 
stability. This same functional rationalization of 
hierarchy also informs the Hindu model of gender 
relations. In accordance with this model, the BJP 
seeks to define women in their traditional roles - as 
wives and mothers who are dutiful and sacrificing. 
As a declaration by the women's wing of the BJP 
states: 
We conceptually differ from what is 
termed as the women's liberation 
movement in the west.... No fundamental 
change in values is desirable. Women in 
India ever had pride of place in the 
household, and the society. That has only 
to be re-established and re-affirmed.... The 
BJP pledges itself to restore to women the 
position of equality with men that the 
Indian tradition proposed and accepted. 
(Cossman and Kapur 1993) 
Obviously, any proposal for a common 
civil code that is circumscribed by such an 
understanding of gender roles and gender equality 
is highly problematic. As some feminist scholars 
have pointed out, the notion of equality espoused by 
the BJP is, at best, a formal one. It thus asserts that 
men and women should be treated equally, and 
argues against the necessity for any special 
treatment of women (except perhaps in some 
patriarchal ways). The same argument also informs 
the BJP's treatment of minorities: each person and 
each community should be treated equally. In this 
view, secularism should treat each religious 
community similarly, by subjecting them to the 
same set of laws. Thus, the existing Indian legal 
system - in that it allows the practice of multiple 
sets of laws - is inherently antithetical to secularism. 
In this view, the Shah Bano judgment and the 
Muslim Women's Bi l l contradicted the basic tenet 
of both gender justice and secularism. They violated 
the principles of secularism because they reaffirmed 
religious difference over legal uniformity; they 
violated gender justice because they called for 
treating Muslim women differently from women of 
all other religions. 
The Hindu Right's aggressive demand to 
eliminate all ethnic and religious plurality from 
Indian political life not only alienated women, it 
sharpened religious differences. In fact, it has led to 
the articulation of a pervasive and fundamental 
critique of the modernist project of the Indian state 
and the kind of secularization it attempted. This 
critique (advanced primarily by postmodern 
scholars) contends that the supposedly universal 
forms of the modern state do not meet the demands 
of cultural diversity and/or religious freedom in the 
Indian context (or that of other post-colonial states). 
This is because its basic principles of liberty, 
equality and neutrality cannot be implemented 
without serious contradictions (and impinging on 
the rights of minorities). Thus, in place of the 
secular state and its uniform civil code, the 
postmodernists suggest that religious communities 
need to be given the political space to regulate their 
own practices. This would guarantee minorities the 
"right against governability, that is, a right not to 
offer reasons for being different," and to expect 
tolerance of its "unreasonable" ways. The major 
constraint that could be imposed on this right is that 
"each religious group will publicly seek and obtain 
from its members consent for its practices insofar as 
those practices have regulative power over 
members" (Chatterjee 1994,1768). What this means 
at the institutional level for religious communities 
is that its "institutions must have the same degree of 
publicity and representativeness that is demanded of 
all public institutions having regulatory functions" 
(1772). 
There are several rather serious problems 
with the general position advanced by 
postmodernists as well as with the specific 
proposals for an alternative to the liberal-democratic 
secular state in India. We can begin with some of 
the institutional implications of this position and the 
likely effects they would have. First, i f one accepts 
the existence of incommensurate discourses and the 
corresponding "right against governability," then 
what we are left with is a minimal state. The basic 
concern here is that, if the decision as to what 
constitutes valid religious praxis is to be decided 
strictly within a religious forum, then this minimal 
state cannot legitimately protect its citizens from 
any "abuse" done in the name of religion, since the 
state cannot legitimately define abuse. What this 
means is that such questions as whether a Muslim 
woman is entitled to alimony on desertion by her 
husband will be decided within a patriarchal 
religious forum dominated by conservative male 
theologians. While one may argue that the 
oppression of the Muslim women in India at the 
hands of chauvinist male theologians occurs only 
because of the lack of democracy and 
representativeness in the religious forums, this is 
not a solution to the problem. Rather it is to ignore 
the reality. Is one to expect democratic procedure in 
a religious forum which is governed by religious 
laws, where the power to interpret these laws is 
restricted? As the Indian experience has already 
shown, it is all too convenient for the state not to 
address such abuses even when it has the 
constitutional power to oppose them. Ceding the 
right to religious bodies to define such questions 
wil l only give the state further excuses for not 
intervening. 
A second important institutional 
implication of the postmodern position is that by 
favoring religious communities, it inhibits and 
delegitimizes attempts by other non-religious 
collectivities (for example, trade unions or women's 
groups) to claim their democratic space. Thus, for 
example, if a Hindu "religious forum" decides, on 
an "authentic reading" of the Vedas, that lower 
caste Hindus are inherently more suited to manual 
rather than intellectual labor, then neither trade 
unions nor the state can intervene on the part of 
lower-caste Hindus to challenge this reading. 
Underlying the unsavory institutional 
implications of the postmodern position are some 
fundamental epistemological problems, a fuller 
critique of which is beyond the scope of this paper. 
Let us note, however, some of the epistemological 
issues that are relevant to the issue at hand. The first 
is the general postmodern presupposition of the 
incommensurability of discourses across cultures. A 
second problem comprises a basic tendency to 
essentialize the Indian consciousness as immutably 
and uncritically religious. Religious consciousness, 
in and of itself, is not problematic; what is 
problematic is the politicization of this 
consciousness, in particular i f such politicization 
leads to intolerance based on religious differences. 
While postmodern authors acknowledge that the 
politicization of religious consciousness was, in 
large part, a deliberate construct of colonialism, 
they do not allow for the possibility that its effects 
can be overcome. According to them, any project of 
unification (such as the formulation of the Uniform 
Civil Code) is bound to fail if it does not respond to 
the underlying needs and religiosities of the Indian 
people. 
IS THERE AN ALTERNATIVE? 
As this discussion indicates, there are two 
apparently opposed proposals for constitutional 
change in India today. One seeks to eliminate 
religious difference by "normalizing" gender 
relations (and relationships between other social 
groups) within a secularised system. The other 
seeks a consolidation and reaffirmation of religious 
differences and the right of religious communities 
to decide how relationships between its members 
are to be structured. For our purposes, it is critical 
to note that despite their apparent opposition, they 
are actually united in their conceptualization of the 
relationship between gender justice and religious 
freedom: both unequivocally assign priority to the 
latter over the former. By prioritizing the claim of 
religious communities over that of women, both 
these proposals effectively translate into the 
displacement of egalitarian struggles against 
patriarchies. 
Such a prioritizing of religious community 
over all other collectivities is problematic for 
women. As religious leaders seek to unify religious 
communities into aggressive political actors, they 
tend to become increasingly authoritarian and 
demand from their members an uncritical adherence 
to a fixed set of norms. The problem is aggravated 
in a Third World context where access to religious 
texts is often restricted because of impediments like 
illiteracy. Thus, individuals often see their 
membership in religious communities as a 
compulsion, a faith to which they are bound by birth 
and which they cannot leave. As women's 
experiences all over the world have proved, it is this 
lack of an exit option that has provided religions 
(and religious communities) with an important 
means to perpetuate patriarchy. This process of 
administering patriarchy through religion was 
revealed clearly in the case of Shah Bano, 
especially in her capitulation, when she asked the 
Supreme Court to rescind its judgment in her 
favour. Upon reflection and interaction with some 
leading theologians, she had realized that she was a 
"Muslim first." 
The irreconcilable opposition between 
gender justice and secularism that emerged during 
the close of the 1970s intensified during the 1980s. 
The primary reason behind this was the BJPs quest 
for electoral success based on assimilationist 
solutions to the problem of religious strife in India. 
The obvious reaction from minority communities 
was to seek a defense of their identity - of which 
personal laws are an integral part. This defensive 
reaction is manifested in an opposition to the 
uniform civil code proposal, at the cost of other 
issues, such as gender justice. Thus, for women 
(and other non-religious communities, especially 
labor), it becomes difficult to endorse any of these 
positions, since none of them offer any escape from 
the dominant categories of religious identity. 
While assimilat ionism remains 
problematic, and the postmodern suggestion highly 
dangerous, some of the more "secular" proposals for 
a uniform civil code are also problematic. A simple 
"melting down" of all religious personal laws in a 
way that "preserves the best o f the various systems 
of personal law is likely to result in a 
"homogenization of patriarchies"(Sangari 1995, 
3289). In other words, it is not enough simply to 
replace the personal laws by a civil code, unless 
they can be radically reformulated in order to 
establish certain inalienable rights for all women. 
With this objective in view, it is not enough to 
argue that it should be the state, rather than 
religious communities, that should delineate 
women's rights, since the state is one of the 
foremost agents through which patriarchy is 
institutionalized. The critical point is to insist that 
the definition, reformulation and implementation of 
women's rights must emanate out of processes that 
undo these structures of patriarchy. 
It is with the aim of radicalizing the state 
that I suggest the need to reassess the initial period 
of legal reforms in India. It was during this short 
period that most of the gains for women were made. 
What factors were behind this? While a full account 
of this is beyond the scope of this paper, two crucial 
features that characterized the discourses of the 
period may be mentioned. The first was a critique of 
capitalism; the second was a rejection of 
imperialism, especially of the ways in which it 
constructed religious differences. It seems that it is 
time once again to connect the discourses on gender 
justice to these two discourses, namely, a critique of 
imperialism in all its contemporary forms - as well 
as a critique of capitalism. It is only then that 
substantive gains in gender justice can be realised. 
ENDNOTES 
1. Sangari (1995) argues that for women community jurisdiction is as problematic as that of the State. "The former is grinding because 
it intensifies the difficulties of daily, local interpersonal relationships, making it difficult to claim democratic rights contravened by 
personal law. The latter involves problems of implementation, functions through a self-contradicting, increasingly de-legitimized, often 
coercive and patriarchal state machinery." 
2. To get an idea as to how diverse Indian society is, consider the following data: at present, there are 18 official Indian languages, 96 
non-official Indian languages, and 844 recognised dialects in India. There are at least six major religions, most with multiple 
denominations. 
3. Article 25 of the Indian constitution states: 
Right to Freedom of Religion: 
25. Freedom of conscience and free profession, practise and propagation of religion: 
(1) Subject to public order, morality and health and to the other provisions of this Part, all persons are equally entitled to 
freedom of conscience and the right freely to profess, practise and propagate religion. 
(2) Nothing in this article shall prevent the state from making any law 
(a) regulating or restricting any economic, financial or political or other secular activity which may be associated 
with religious practice; 
(b) providing for social welfare and reform and throwing open of Hindu religious institutions of a public character 
to all classes and sections of Hindus. 
4. Article 25. "Nothing in this article shall prevent the State from making any special provision for women and children. Nothing in this 
article or in clause (2) of Article 29 shall prevent the State from making any special provision for the advancement of any socially and 
educationally backward classes of citizens or for the Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes." 
5. Two arguments are most commonly invoked in order to establish the necessity for substantive equality. The first, and probably the 
most common argument for substantive equality is based on some notion of essentialism, i.e. that certain communities are essentially 
weak or underprivileged and a just legal framework should be able to protect them. The second justification for substantive equality 
comes from the explicit recognition of discrimination that has occurred over time and cannot be redressed unless special provisions are 
put in place. 
6. Article 17. Abolition of Untouchability: "Untouchability" is abolished and its practice in any form is forbidden. The enforcement of 
any disability arising out of "Untouchability" shall be an offence punishable in accordance with law. 
7. As a legal category, personal laws are to be distinguished from territorial law, where the latter applies to people by virtue of their 
connection to a particular territory or state. In general, personal laws operate only in issues regarding which territorial laws have not been 
drawn up. The British, allegedly in their efforts not to intervene in religious practices, ruled that personal laws, drawn from the religious 
texts of the respective religious communities were to be given precedence over territorial or civil law. The areas to be guided by personal 
law were to include issues such as inheritance, marriage, caste and other religious usages of institutions (Plan of Warren Hastings: Rule 
23, cited in Subbarao, V. Family Law in India, (Madras: 1975), pg. 264. 
8. The Madras Devadasis (Prevention of Dedication) Act, 1947. In the same year, the Temple Entry Act made it a punishable offence 
to prevent any person on the ground of untouchability from entering or worshipping in a Hindu temple. 
9. Between 1951 and 1955, the following Acts were passed in the Indian Parliament: The Special Marriages Act (1954); The Hindu 
Marriage & Divorce Bill (1955), the Hindu Succession Act (1956) and the Adoption & Maintenance Act (1956). 
10. Table 1. Major Legal Reforms in Indian Religious Law 
1829 Abolition of the practice of widow-immolation (Suttee) 
1929 Child Remarriage Restraint Act 
1937 Hindu Women's Right to Property Act 
1937 Shariat Act 
1947 Madras Devadasis (Prevention of Dedication) Act 
1954 The Special Marriages Act 
1955 Hindu Marriage & Divorce Bill 
1956 Adoption & Maintenance Act 
1956 Hindu Succession Act 
1956 Immoral Traffic Prevention Act 
1961 Dowry Prohibition Act 
Source: V. Subbarao, Family Law in India, (Madras: 1975) 
11. While I cannot enter into this debate here, I would like to make one observation. Some of the major legal reforms that occurred 
during colonial rule - the abolition of Sati, the remarriage of widows and the banning of child marriages - were initiated and championed 
by Indian social reformers. While they might have been influenced by Western ideas of modernity, there is no conclusive evidence that 
these reformers were drawing exclusively on Western principles of social justice. To argue that would be to deny the possibility of any 
indigenous sources of social change or resistance. 
12. A similar controversy also surrounded Sarla Mudga vs Union of India (and others AIR 1995 Supreme Court 1531). The question 
in this case was "whether a Hindu husband, married under Hindu Law, by embracing Islam, can solemnize a second marriage. Whether 
such a marriage without having the first marriage dissolved under law would be a valid marriage, qua the first wife who continues to 
be Hindu? Whether the apostate husband would be guilty of the offence under section 494 of the Indian Penal Code"? After a careful 
review of Hindu personal law, and the Hindu Marriage Act 1955 as well as several decisions of the Indian courts, it was concluded that 
the "second marriage of a Hindu husband after his conversion to Islam is a void marriage in terms of section 494 of the Indian Penal 
Code." 
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